This is IMO rather odd logic. I skimmed the opinion. If identical logic were applied to ordinary stock shares, it seems like it’s saying that shares in a C corp are securities if the C corp sells them to institutional investors, but that if the C corp sells the same shares by putting limit orders on a stock exchange (NASDAQ, for example) and Reddit-reading meme stock buyers buy them, then somehow the C corp didn’t actually engage in a sale of securities.
The holder of a stock certificate has a formal legal contractual relationship with the corporation that issued the stock. The holder of a token does not have a contractual relationship with the entity that issued the token.
Now there's probably some silliness in the fact that if Alice creates a token and sells it to Bob, it's an investment contract, but if Alice creates a token sells it to Mark the middleman who then sells it to Bob it's not an investment contract and therefore not covered by the SEC. But this really comes down to how Federalist society wing of judges have changed Constitutional law.
Up until about 20 years ago, if Congress passed a law that wasn't very well defined or left a loophole open, courts were generally willing to consider the original intent of the lawmakers and interpret the law relative in a commonsense way even if it went against the specific language used by Congress. Federalist Society judges would argue that courts should generally only apply the law as it's actually written (i.e. an investment contract requires an actual legal contract). The argument is that Congress is around and still exists and perfectly free and able to update the existing laws if they're unhappy with the wording or oversight of previous legislation.
This is a fundamental disagreement in Constitutional law. Should courts use commonsense interpretation of the meaning of the laws or should Congress itself, as the actual elected representative, be responsible for updating laws and courts just enforce the plain meaning. It's also tinted by the fact that Congress today has become hopelessly gridlocked and obstructionist, and we're largely incapable of passing sweeping legislation. So generally if you're not a fan of big government or regulation, you're going to be biased towards one view and vice versa.
I had a similar thought at first but then read the actual ruling and it made more sense and it all stems on the 3rd prong of the Howie Test. It states there needs to be a "reasonable expectation of profits derived from the managerial efforts of others" which a share of stock has via dividends, etc. regardless how it was acquired.
For XRP, there is no explicit rights to profits via the efforts of others via the instrument so you then have to look at the agreement made via the contract between the purchaser and the issuer.
On page 18 of the ruling it outlines this for Institutional Investors:
'''The third prong of Howey examines whether the economic reality surrounding Ripple’s Institutional Sales led the Institutional Buyers to have “a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”... Based on the totality of circumstances, the Court finds that reasonable investors, situated in the position of the Institutional Buyers, would have purchased XRP with the expectation that they would derive profits from Ripple’s efforts. '''
However for "Programmatic Buyers" on exchange the ruling said:
'''Having considered the economic reality of the Programmatic Sales, the Court concludes that the undisputed record does not establish the third Howey prong. Whereas the Institutional Buyers reasonably expected that Ripple would use the capital it received from its sales to improve the XRP ecosystem and thereby increase the price of XRP, Programmatic Buyers could not reasonably expect the same.'''
So because there is both no expectation of profits tied to the managerial efforts of others, nor from the contract made by a buyer on exchange, the court ruled the 3rd prong does not apply. Stocks fail the first part of this.
> '''Having considered the economic reality of the Programmatic Sales, the Court concludes that the undisputed record does not establish the third Howey prong. Whereas the Institutional Buyers reasonably expected that Ripple would use the capital it received from its sales to improve the XRP ecosystem and thereby increase the price of XRP, Programmatic Buyers could not reasonably expect the same.'''
I don't get this - why were Programmatic Buyers buying it then? I would agree if Programmatic Buyers were buying XRP to immediately use to then buy pizza or whatever, but nobody in cryptoassets does this.
Every individual person buying XRP seems to me to be buying it for the same reason as the institutional investors.
Hmm, I guess that makes sense - I had forgotten that 'institutional investors' were probably buying direct from Ripple. But if I tie it back to stocks, I guess I see institutional investors here as the ones buying at IPO, but individual investors are buying from each other on an exchange are still buying 'securities', are they not? Maybe they just are not that analogous.
Not at all. The shares in a C-corp are securities because they will definitely pass the Howey Test. Also, stocks are considered securities by a statute. It is unclear whether XRP tokens themselves pass the Howey test. (I believe the Howey Test is extremely outdated and needs to be revamped, but that's a different topic.)
