It seems mind-boggling for me that the mere fact that the device was installed by the then-owner would be enough to make this OK without a warrant. It seems no different than leaving a sticky tracking device on a public street where you know the suspect is going walk, so that he unknowingly picks it up on his shoe and can be monitored...pretty much forever.
EDIT: Wait, on second thought, are you sure? The main opinion says
> The first case, Knotts, upheld against Fourth Amendment challenge the use of a “beeper” that had been placed in a container of chloroform, allowing law enforcement to monitor the location of the container. 460 U. S., at 278. We said that there had been no infringement of Knotts’ reasonable expectation of privacy since the information obtained—the location of the automobile carrying the container on public roads, and the location of the off-loaded container in open fields near Knotts’ cabin—had been voluntarily conveyed to the public.6 Id., at 281–282. But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. The holding in Knotts addressed only the former, since the
latter was not at issue. The beeper had been placed in
the container before it came into Knotts’ possession, with
the consent of the then-owner. 460 U. S., at 278. Knotts
did not challenge that installation, and we specifically de-
clined to consider its effect on the Fourth Amendment
analysis. Id., at 279, n. Knotts would be relevant, perhaps, if the Government were making the argument that
what would otherwise be an unconstitutional search is
not such where it produces only public information. The
Government does not make that argument, and we know
of no case that would support it.
To me, that says that Knotts is distinguised because all the data that the police used was available publicly, i.e. that Knotts did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (which, presumably, Jones did in the recent case).
I read that part differently. They're asking if the Government is arguing that, since the search produces only public information here, like in Knotts, that would mean that it's automatically constitutional under Knotts; and they conclude that no, that can't override the trespass involved in installation.
It seems mind-boggling for me that the mere fact that the device was installed by the then-owner would be enough to make this OK without a warrant. It seems no different than leaving a sticky tracking device on a public street where you know the suspect is going walk, so that he unknowingly picks it up on his shoe and can be monitored...pretty much forever.
EDIT: Wait, on second thought, are you sure? The main opinion says
> The first case, Knotts, upheld against Fourth Amendment challenge the use of a “beeper” that had been placed in a container of chloroform, allowing law enforcement to monitor the location of the container. 460 U. S., at 278. We said that there had been no infringement of Knotts’ reasonable expectation of privacy since the information obtained—the location of the automobile carrying the container on public roads, and the location of the off-loaded container in open fields near Knotts’ cabin—had been voluntarily conveyed to the public.6 Id., at 281–282. But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. The holding in Knotts addressed only the former, since the latter was not at issue. The beeper had been placed in the container before it came into Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-owner. 460 U. S., at 278. Knotts did not challenge that installation, and we specifically de- clined to consider its effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis. Id., at 279, n. Knotts would be relevant, perhaps, if the Government were making the argument that what would otherwise be an unconstitutional search is not such where it produces only public information. The Government does not make that argument, and we know of no case that would support it.
To me, that says that Knotts is distinguised because all the data that the police used was available publicly, i.e. that Knotts did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (which, presumably, Jones did in the recent case).