DANE stapling died in committee at the IETF; there's no solid answer for how to implement it in a way where an attacker with control of a root certificate can't strip it off a TLS session, and if you assume an attacker can't control a WebPKI root certificate, DANE isn't serving any purpose either.
Meanwhile: DANE and CT don't have the same functionality at all. DANE defines away the need for transparency by saying that the PKI will be operated by entities we all intrinsically and completely trust (world governments). CT says "we don't trust the PKI at all, so let's log it". A lack of any kind of DANE transparency log is one small reason among many that DANE isn't taken seriously.
Meanwhile: DANE and CT don't have the same functionality at all. DANE defines away the need for transparency by saying that the PKI will be operated by entities we all intrinsically and completely trust (world governments). CT says "we don't trust the PKI at all, so let's log it". A lack of any kind of DANE transparency log is one small reason among many that DANE isn't taken seriously.